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Privacy and the Growing Plight of the Homeless:
Reconsidering the Values Underlying the Fourth
Amendment
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all
his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! 1
I. INTRODUCIION
In the eighteenth-century American Colonies, a male citizen had to meet
certain property qualifications before he could vote in political elections. 2 One
who qualified was sometimes called a "householder," meaning he had the
requisite size house or tract of land to gain the right of suffrage.3 To
contemporary Americans, the thought of basing voting rights on one's property
seems ridiculous-we have been indoctrinated with the concept that each citizen
is born with certain inalienable rights that protect him or her regardless of
wealth and material success.
However, as I will illustrate in this Comment, our Fourth Amendment4
doctrine has not been able to fully escape this archaic entanglement with
1 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting from a speech by
Parliament Member Pitt in the House of Commons, March 1763).
2 OscAR T. BARcK, JR. & HUGH T. LEFLER, COLONIAL AMERICA 245 (2d ed. 1968)
(Connecticut: an estate worth forty shillings annually or forty pounds of personal property;
Delaware: fifty acres of land or forty pounds of personal property; Georgia: fifty acres of
land; Maryland: fifty acres of land or forty pounds of personal property; Massachusetts: an
estate worth forty shillings annually or forty pounds of personal property; New Hampshire:
fifty pounds of personal property; New Jersey: one hundred acres of land, or property
worth fifty pounds; New York: forty pounds of personal property or land; North Carolina:
fifty acres of land; Pennsylvania: fifty acres of land or fifty pounds of personal property;
Rhode Island: personal property worth forty pounds or yielding fifty shillings annually;
South Carolina: one hundred acres of land on which taxes were paid or a town house or lot
worth sixty pounds on which taxes were paid or payment of ten shillings in taxes; Virginia:
fifty acres of vacant land, twenty-five acres of cultivated land, and a house twelve feet by
twelve feet or a town lot and a house twelve feet by twelve feet).
3 Id. at 244.
4The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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property because it has evolved under the assumptions that each citizen has a
"house" and that each person has some minimal access to personal property.
With this assumption, the law has substantially defined the scope and
application of Fourth Amendment privacy rights in terms of common law
property and possessory interests. This connection would be rational,
convenient, and ultimately fair in a society where each citizen could meet the
minimum property requirements; however, with the increasing number and
growing awareness of the homeless in the United States, 5 the injustice of this
property-based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is becoming clear.
Under the current Supreme Court interpretation, the right of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment does not apply unless the defendant had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the particular space or object that was searched.6
The threshold question in determining whether the defendant had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" usually hinges upon whether the defendant had a
superior right of possession vis-a-vis the government in the space searched or
the item seized, and whether the government interfered with that right by
conducting the search. Stated more simply, the implicit question in most
current Fourth Amendment cases to determine if a right of privacy has been
violated is whether the government trespassed on private property to make the
search or seizure.7 However, given the growing number of American citizens
who are unable to buy or rent private property for their living space,8 we are
increasingly denying a human right on the basis of wealth. The exclusive rights
of the "householder" have become an issue once again; while a person now has
the right to vote without owning property, he forfeits his right to full
constitutional protection of his privacy with his inability to afford housing.
This problem is clearly brought to light in the recent case State of
Connecticut v. Mooney.9 In Mooney, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was
faced with an issue of first impression in the state: whether the Fourth
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 Estimates vary from 300,000 to 3,000,000 as to the current number of homeless in
America. See John J. Dilulio Jr., There But for Fortune-the Homeless: Who They Are and
How to Help Them, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1991, at 27. During 1991, requests for
emergency shelter in twenty-eight major cities rose by 17%, and 15% of such requests went
unmet. More Homeless Reported, THE FINANCIAL PoST, Dec. 17, 1991, at 2. Similar
figures were recently recognized by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
See Community for Creative Violence v. Unknown Agents, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9093 at
*16 n.6 (1992) (In holding that homeless guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the community.shelter operated by the plaintiff, the court stated, "to reject this notion would
be to read millions of homeless citizens out of the text of the Fourth Amendment.").
6 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 5.
9 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
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Amendment protects the living space or dwelling of a homeless person residing
on public land.' 0 The defendant in this case, David Mooney, was arrested for
murder and robbery after the police were tipped off by a co-felon who had
previously been arrested for involvement in the same murder and robbery.l"
With the defendant in custody, the police questioned his girlfriend at her place
of employment, and at their request, she directed a detective to Mooney's place
of abode to search for possible evidence connecting Mooney to the murder. 12
She led him to the defendant's "home"-a secluded area under a highway
bridge abutment on land owned by the Connecticut Department of
Transportation.13 The area was not readily visible or accessible from the
highway and could only be reached by crossing through heavy underbrush and
down a steep embankment covered with crushed stone.14 The defendant had
been living under the bridge abutment for approximately one month; he was the
only person occupying this space, and he had no other home.15 The police
officer found Mooney's personal belongings organized on cement support
beams which he had been using as shelves.16 In an attempt to decorate his
abode, Mooney had a calendar hanging on one of the cement walls. 17 A nearby
reservoir conveniently offered Mooney a place to bathe each morning. Indeed,
Mooney had clearly taken the steps necessary to provide this area with all the
essential features of a home. In order to avoid theft, he tried to avoid being
seen when he entered and exited the area. 1
The detective promptly conducted a search of the defendant's living space
without securing a search warrant and seized his personal belongings, including
a closed duffel bag and a closed cardboard box which contained items that
inculpated him in the murder. 19
Based on the evidence obtained in this search and seizure, Mooney was
convicted for murder and robbery in the Superior Court of the Judicial District
of New Haven.20 The trial court, using the same "reasonable expectations" test
proffered by the United States Supreme Court to determine the scope of the
10 Brief for the Appellant at 6, Mooney (No. 13737).




14 Brief for the Appellant at 8, Mooney (No. 13737).
15 Id. at9.
16 588 A.2d at 150.
17 Kevin Royer, Discourse: 7.he Mooney Blues: Homelessness and Constitutional
Security from Unreasonable Searches, 72 B.U. L. REV. 443, 445 (1992) (citing David
Margolick, Poverty and Privacy: Home Sweet Niche?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1990 § 1, at
25).
18 588 A.2d at 151.
19 Id. at 150.
20 Id. at 145.
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Fourth Amendment,21 held that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to
Mooney's "house"-his expectation of privacy in his home was not reasonable
because it was located on public property. As a result, the detective was not in
error for searching the defendant's habitat without a search warrant, and the
evidence he obtained as a result was admissible against the defendant.22
Mooney appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut claiming, among
other things, that the lower court erred in holding the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to his "home." 23 The appellant argued that the trial court's
decision created, on the basis of wealth, an underclass of citizens such as the
defendant who are not entitled to the same constitutional protections as their
more fortunate counterparts who can afford to buy or rent a home.2 4 If the
defendant had owned the space in which he lived, or if the trial court would
have defined "house" in the text of the Fourth Amendment to include shelters
occupied by citizens who cannot afford to buy or rent a dwelling, then the
search would have been presumptively invalid without a warrant.25
The reasoning of the trial court implies that a homeless person can have no
safe haven for any of his personal effects or papers other than upon his person,
unless he can afford to own or lease private space. Under this theory, a
homeless individual too poor to afford a storage locker automatically waives all
privacy claims to his diary, letters, books, papers, or other personal effects not
in his immediate possession. Such a constitutional doctrine would seriously
compromise the equal protection principles laid down in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution .... 26
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court, finding that the
defendant had a "reasonable expectation" of privacy in the closed duffel bag
and closed cardboard box in which the incriminating evidence was
discovered. 27 However, having found for the defendant on this narrower
ground, the court refused to address the argument that the Fourth Amendment
should extend its protection of privacy to homeless individuals' living areas and
"homes" located on property which they do not own.28 Thus, in the state of
21 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
22 The judicial rule which renders inadmissible any evidence acquired through the
means of a search violative of the Fourth Amendment is called the "exclusionary rule."
23 588 A.2d at 150.
24 Brief for the Appellant at 11, Mooney (No. 13737).
25 See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
26 Brief for the Appellant at 11, Mooney (No. 13737).
27 588 A.2d at 152.
28 Id. The opinion by the Court stated:
We assume for the purposes of this decision that the state is correct that the defendant's
broad claim of fourth amendment protection in the area involved must fail. We
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Connecticut as in every other state in our country, the increasing number of
citizens who cannot afford housing29 are denied the constitutional protections of
privacy enjoyed by the more affluent members of our society.
This Comment will discuss the issue that the Supreme Court of
Connecticut declined to decide in Mooney: the Fourth Amendment's inadequate
protection of homeless individuals' privacy in their living spaces or "homes."
Part I[ will trace the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine from its
beginnings in 1886 with Boyd v. United States,30 when privacy was intimately
intertwined with private property, 31 through the Warren Court's 1967 decisions
in Katz v. United States32 and Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,33
which declared that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property, and [we] have increasingly
discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts." 3 4
Part III will explore how the subsequent Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
dismantled the Warren Court's privacy analysis, quickly returning us to the
pre-Katz era and once again placing the emphasis of the Fourth Amendment on
property. Specifically, this section will address how the present Court has
returned us to property concepts through their skewed application of Harlan's
two-prong "reasonable expectation" test, and will then focus on the present
Court's narrow interpretation of the word "house" in the text of the
Constitution.
Finally, Part IV will discuss a Fourth Amendment test that is based on
privacy instead of property. Additionally, this section will discuss Hegel's
personality theory of property and its present uses and manifestations in
American law.
conclude, nonetheless, that the defendant's alternate, more narrow claim-that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his duffel bag and cardboard box located there-has
merit.
Id.
29 See supra note 5.
30 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31 See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
32 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
34 1d. at304.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
II. PROPERTY V. PRIVACY: THE EVOLVING SCOPE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT FROM 1886 TO 1967
A. Pre-Katz Analysis
Prior to the landmark decision of Katz v. United States35 in 1967, the
Supreme Court strictly construed the scope of the Fourth Amendment-
extending it only to the "areas" explicitly stated in its text: persons, houses,
papers, and effects. 36 Thus, this language was seen as a prohibition against
unreasonable government intrusions into an individual's "person" or body, and
certain tangible objects of his private property37-his "house," "papers," and
"effects" therein. 38 In this era, property interests were not only a primary
element of search-and-seizure analysis, they were determinate. "Persons
aggrieved by searches and seizures needed to prove a property interest in the
place searched or item seized superior to that of the Government's in order to
gain redress .... "39 This emphasis on possessory rights and ownership was
consistent with the philosophical beliefs of the times from which pre-Katz
analysis developed because, as evidenced by the prevalence in the Colonies of
voting laws based on one's capital worth,40 early American society held
property and wealth to be the essential ingredients for the survival of liberty
and truth.
It seems that through the republic's first century and a half, property-
security of legally justified possession and material expectation-was the
paradigm of the constitutionally protected private sphere. So it dramatically
was during the constitutional ascendency of 'classical,' 'laissez-faire capitalist,'
or 'substantive due process' jurisprudence.
.... [S]ecurity of property holdings was considered a matter not just of
private self-interest but of general political concern. Property was, to be sure,
one primary mode of private liberty and self-realization, but it was more: a
claim going to the heart of the prospects for successful republican self-
government. In the ancient and early modem republican traditions of which the
founding generation were still in some measure partaking, an unquestionably
secure base of material support was viewed as indispensable if one's
independence and competence as a participant in public affairs was to be
guaranteed. Material security was thought necessary to ensure the authenticity
35 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 357 (1974).
3 7 United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1477 (1986) (McKay, I., dissenting).
38 Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 191 (1986).
39 806 F.2d at 1477 (McKay, I., dissenting).
40 See supra note 2.
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and reliability of one's politically expressed judgment regarding what course of
policy would best conduce to the rights and other interests of the governed.
The person whose material security became a matter of doubt or
contingency... because the person had no property and thus depended for
livelihood on the grace of others.., would too likely act in public councils
either as the tool of his patron or as the tool of his own particular, immediate,
and possibly delusive material interest.... [That person would not be reliably
acting in the more systematic or longer-run interest of either national prosperity
or common liberty, including the person's own. In the traditional republican
dictum, that person was not 'independent' but 'corrupt.' In short, the
distribution of secure property endowments was regarded as a matter of
constitutive political concern, an essential factor in any scheme of popular
sovereignty valued as a medium of the people's self-determination or self-
protection regarding both general welfare and individual liberty. 4 1
This philosophy manifested itself in the Supreme Court's first major
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment-Boyd v. United States.42 Although
this famous case liberally expanded the definition of search-and-seizure to any
government action that had the effect of a search-and-seizure, the Court's idea
of what this definition protected was explicitly grounded in the common-law
property concepts of possesion, ownership, and private property. In the
majority opinion, Justice Bradley stated that any stolen object, or any property
acquired by a person through a method which did not grant a legally
recognized possessory interest, could be searched and seized without violating
the holder's Fourth Amendment rights.43 Implicit in this analysis is the idea
that the privacy right in a person's home is protected from a government search
if he legally owned it or obtained possession of it through some other method
that the law condones and legitimizes. From this initial "ownership"
distinction, the problematic roots of our current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, in the context of the homeless, are evident.
41 Frank L Michelman, Possession vs. Disti'bution in the Constitutional Idea of
Property, 72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1327-29 (1987) (citations omitted).
42 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
43 Id. at 623. See also NELSON B. LASsON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION 108 (1937):
In the first place, said the Court, the property which may be searched for and seized
must be such that the government or other claimant is entitled to its possession, or to
which the defendant is not entitled, such as stolen goods, gambling implements,
counterfeit coin, etc. Search warrants may be used for these things but this is entirely
different from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers in order to
get information therein contained ....
1992]
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Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the language of the
Court continued to espouse a deep commitment to equating Fourth Amendment
application with common-law property concepts.44 This commitment is most
evident in the "trespass doctrine" that emerged with Olmstead v. United
States.45 Olmstead was convicted for a violation of the National Prohibition
Act based upon evidence the government collected by tapping his telephone.
Noting that the government's information was obtained through the
insertion of wires into public telephone lines which were not located on
Olmstead's property, the Court held that the existence of a physical trespass46
was always a prerequisite for establishing any violation of the Fourth
Amendment.47 Therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights had not been
violated because the government had not trespassed onto his property or other
area where he had a legally recognized possessory interest.
Under the Olmstead and other pre-Katz courts, Daviu Mooney could never
establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment in his living space. Since the
government owned the land under the bridge, any police or other government
agents who invaded his privacy could not be considered trespassers.
B. Katz v. United States: A Short-Lived Privacy Analysis Free from the
Traditional Reliance on Property
With the landmark decision of Katz v. United States48 in 1967, the Warren
Court had apparently freed the Fourth Amendment from its historical
entanglement with private property and finally placed it into the realm of
individual dignity and privacy. Like Boyd and Olmstead, this case can be seen
as a reflection of the property beliefs prevalent in the era.
In Katz, the defendant had been convicted for illegal bookmaking based on
evidence confiscated by F.B.I. agents who recorded an incriminating phone call
that the defendant made from a public phone booth. 49 The agents recorded the
conversation by placing eavesdropping equipment on the outside of the
44 See infra notes 45-47 and note 74 and accompanying text.
45 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
46 The term "trespass" implies the existence of private property or a legal possessory
interest in this context. Black's Law Dictionary defines trespass as: "An unlawful
interference with one's person, property, or rights." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th
ed. 1990).
47 277 U.S. at 460-65 (The Court noted that although evidence of a trespass is always
required, such evidence was not determinative of a violation. Thus, a government trespass
onto one's land may not be a violation under the "open fields" doctrine, which denied
application of the Fourth Amendment to open fields on one's property.).
48 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 9 Id. at 348.
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telephone booth.50 Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, Katz would
not have had a basis for claiming a constitutional violation of his privacy
because the evidence was seized on public land and no trespass of his property
had taken place51 'The Court, however, was unwilling to allow such
government behavior to withstand constitutional scrutiny, and in overturning
eighty years of Fourth Amendment doctrine, Justice Stewart stated:
"[The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited."... [O]nce it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply "areas"-against
unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Onstead... have been so eroded
by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can
no longer be regarded as controlling. 52
More specifically, the Court held that what a person knowingly and
intentionally exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not protected by
the Fourth AmendmentS3-"[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 54 With
these words, the Court achieved a general expansion of privacy protection
50 1d.
51 Barbara R. Edwards, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Open Fields: A Comment
on Oliver and 77ornton, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 637, 650 (1984).
52 389 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 361. In his concurrence, Harlan stated that objects which one exposes to the
public are not protected "because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."
This language gav6 birth to the "plain-view" doctrine. This doctrine has played a role in
denying Fourth Amendment protection to homeless individuals when their personal
belongings are open to observation by the public. See generally Peter Mancini, Discourse:
Money and Privacy: Some Tough Questions, 72 B.U. L. REV. 425 (1992) (arguing that
the plain-view doctrine nullifies homeless persons' claims to Fourth Amendment
protection). However, it is clear after examining the language in Harlan's opinion that the
plain-view doctrine does not logically apply to homeless individuals. The plain-view
doctrine is simply a tool for analyzing the "subjective expectation" prong of the Katz test: if
one exposes his personal belongings to the public, then he must not intend or desire to keep
them private. However, this assumes that one has an alternative to exposing one's
confidences to the public-that one has a private shelter. Obviously, homeless individuals
may not always intend and desire to expose their belongings to passersby when they have no
private place to store them. The exposure of a homeless person's confidences reflects the
lack of an alternative rather than a conscious choice to reveal his private belongings. Thus,
the basic assumption underlying the plain-view doctrine is flawed in regards to the
homeless, and its application is equally illogical.
54 Id. at 351.
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under the Fourth Amendment, and it appeared that future analysis under that
Amendment would focus on the individual's privacy expectations, privacy
needs, and his efforts to seclude others.
If the issue in State of Connecticut v. Mooney had presented itself to the
Warren Court in the 1967 Term, it is conceivable that the Court would have
extended privacy protection to such homeless individuals as David Mooney.
Focusing on the language, "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected," we can realize
this possibility. While David Mooney's "house" was accessible to the public, it
was clear that he "sought to preserve his particular habitat and its contents as
private." 55 His home was not readily visible or accessible from the highway
and could only be reached by crossing through heavy underbrush and down a
steep embankment covered with crushed stone. 56 He had the exclusive use and
quiet enjoyment of the area,57 and his living space was "secreted in a manner
intended to hide it from the view of those very few individuals who might
happen to wander by."58
In subsequent interpretations of Katz, however, a newly comprised Court
began narrowing instead of nurturing Justice Stewart's opinion, and while
continuing to disguise itself in the "privacy" language of Katz, the Court
essentially returned the focus of the Fourth Amendment to its traditional
property orientation.
III. THE POST-KA7Z MODERN VIEW: A PSUEDO-ABANDONMENT OF
PROPERTY RELIANCE
A. The Two-Prong "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
The test laid down by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz
soon became adopted as the modem "privacy test." Harlan, intending to mold
the ideas of the majority into a workable formula, proposed a two-prong
inquiry. In order for Fourth Amendment protection to attach, the defendant
must have "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second,... that expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable."' 59 This two-fold requirement was subsequently adopted by the
Court and has remained the cornerstone in privacy analysis to the present day.
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have repeatedly assured us that they
have "repudiated the notion that 'arcane distinctions developed in
55 Brief for the Appellant at 7, Mooney (No. 13737).
56 Id. at 8.
57 1d. at9.
58 Id. at8.
59 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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property... law' ought to control our Fourth Amendment inquiry."60 Despite
these assurances, their subsequent decisions have virtually returned us to
property-based doctrine. While cloaking their analysis in the modem Katz test,
the Court has narrowed the test to the point where its protection often equates
with property rights. 61 In other words, when deciding whether a particular
defendant has "an actual expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize," the Court has delineated ownership and trespass as primary and
often controlling factors. If a defendant does not have a superior possessory
interest vis-a-vis the government in the area searched or item seized, or if no
trespass has occurred, the Court will probably conclude that he has no "actual
expectation of privacy" or that his actual expectation is not "one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." 62
A case that clearly highlights the problem with this property-based
interpretation of the modem "reasonable-expectation" test in the context of
homelessness is United States v. Ruckmoan.63 The defendant in this case,
Ruckman, was living in a natural cave on Bureau of Land Management
property, 64 and had a warrant issued against him for failure to appear in
60 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980).
61 Other common factors in modem Fourth Amendment cases include the degree of
intrusiveness and the custom of the community. See Elizabeth Schutz, Note, The Fourth
Amendnent Rights ofthe Homeless, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1003 (1992). However, in cases
involving the homeless on public property, the determinative factor, either explicitly or
implicitly, has been ownership.
62 See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text. Two recent Supreme Court cases
illustrate the Court's reliance on the "trespass" theory. First, in Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), the government obtained evidence by flying an airplane
over the defendant's property and taking photographs with an electronic device that allowed
objects one-half inch in diameter to be visible. In holding that Fourth Amendment interests
were not violated, the Court seemed to focus on the fact that the airspace above the
defendant's land was not his property, thus no trespass occurred. See Seth H. Ruzi, Note,
Reviving the Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the Open View Doctrine: Dow
Chemical v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191, 228 (1988) ("While couched in Katz
terminology, the Dow majority's analysis effectively overruled the Katz standard and
reverted to a physical trespass inquiry.").
Likewise, in California v. (iraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the police used a private
airplane to fly over the defendant's property to locate marijuana growing in his backyard.
Even though the defendant had placed a ten-foot wall around his yard to shield it from
passersby, the Court held that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred given the lack
of a trespass by the police. See Schutz, supra note 61, at 1013 ("Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, reintroduced the notion of trespass into the Court's view of the Fourth
Amendment by emphasizing that the police had made their observations from within the
public navigable airspace and that they did so 'in a physically nonintrusive manner.'")
(citations omitted).
63 806 F.2d 1471 (1986).
6 4 Id. at 1474 (McKay, I., dissenting).
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Washington County, Utah, for a misdemeanor charge.65 After learning where
Ruckman lived, "six heavily armed officers, [including] local sheriff's officers
and federal law enforcement officers" 66 proceeded to the site where they found
a cave that "had wood and other articles placed in its opening so as to form
some kind of living quarters. There was a wooden door that was closed but not
locked and no one was in the vicinity." 67 Ruckman had installed the
"rudimentary comforts of home" inside the cave, including a bed, camp stove,
and lantern.68 Without a search warrant, the officers searched the cave and
seized three weapons which Ruckman possessed in violation of a federal law. 69
Approximately one hour later, Ruckman returned to his cave and was arrested.
Eight days later, with Ruckman incarcerated, local authorities returned to his
home, without a warrant, "in an effort to clean it out and remove all this stuff
that was in there, the door and everything else." 70
In applying the*Katz two-prong test, the Court focused on the second
branch: whether Ruckman's expectation of privacy was one that society is
prepared to recognize. The majority found that his expectation was not
reasonable "in light of the fact that he could be ousted by [government]
authorities from the place he was occupying at any time." 71 In other words,
because the government owned the land and could oust the trespassing
defendant at any time, the Court concluded that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his habitat and personal items. Again, in evaluating
the defendant's "reasonableness" the Court emphasized the superior possessory
rights of the government and the common-law property concepts of trespass
and "ouster." The majority simply confused ouster with privacy-two
completely different concepts if privacy is viewed as independent from property
rights. For example, a plethora of scenarios exist where a homeless person
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 1475.
69 Id. at 1474.
70 Id. at 1475 (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 1473. The majority opinion stated:
The government's authority over federal lands has been clearly stated by the Supreme
Court, "Mhe power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations." This power derives from the Constitution. Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the
Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to
the United States." A necessary ancillary to this regulatory power over lands within the
public domain is the power to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from
trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain
rights ......
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could be "ousted" from a certain area or living space without necessarily
surrendering or waiving his privacy rights in his personal possessions located
there. The most obvious of these is for him simply to take his personal
possessions with him when he is ousted from the area. The majority view was
summed up in the last paragraph:
[Whether a place constitutes a person's "home" for this purpose cannot be
decided without any attention to its location or the means by which it was
acquired; that is, whether the occupancy and construction were in bad faith72 is
highly relevant. Where the plaintiffs had no legal right to occupy the land and
build structures on. it, those faits accomplis could give rise to no reasonable
expectation of privacy even if the [defendant] did own the resulting
structures. 73
In dissent, Judge McKay pointed out the archaic reasoning of the
majority's opinion:
[T]he court takes a giant step backward in Fourth Amendment analysis when it
hinges its determination of whether Mr. Ruckman had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his dwelling on whether or not he was a "trespasser." In the early
days of fourth amendment doctrine, property interests were not only a central
tenet of search and seizure analysis, they were determinative.... [N]o fourth
amendment violation was deemed to occur without a trespass by the
Government upon property of the defendant-a rule better known as "the
trespass doctrine." However, as our society evolved, the emphasis of the
protection we enjoy from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures
also evolved. Nearly twenty years ago, [in 1967,] the Supreme Court
recognized this evolution.... [by stating,] "We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather
than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers
rested on property concepts."74
From the majority's analysis in Ruckman, it is apparent why David
Mooney was denied constitutional privacy protection for his home in State of
Connecticut v. Mooney. Our Fourth Amendment doctrine is still entangled with
property, for the simple distinction remains that if Mooney could have afforded
to own or rent a home in 1991, then the Fourth Amendment would have
protected this living space.
72 The Court must not intend to imply that a homeless person acts in bad faith by
trying to provide himself with shelter. The meaning intended must be that Ruckman had no
right to occupy the land.
73 806 F.2d at 1474 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
74 Id. at 1476.
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B. Interpretation of "House" in the Text of the Fourth Amendment: The
Implicit Requirement for Property Ownership
When courts apply the Fourth Amendment, "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" enjoy special protection because they fall explicitly within the language
of the Amendment.75 For example, when the prosecution is using evidence
discovered during a warrantless search of a defendant's "house," the
government must always overcome an inherent presumption against the validity
of such a search, and courts will usually find the home protected per se without
even discussing the defendant's reasonable expectations and other relevant legal
applications. 76 This special regard for the privacy of one's "house" is deeply
rooted in the values of Anglo-American history,77 and was of primary concern
for the drafter's of the Constitution, having fresh in their minds the Writs of
Assistance, Quartering Acts, and other measures taken by the Crown which
robbed the Colonists of privacy in their homes. 78
However, implicit in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and perhaps
largely unnoticed, is the narrow definition of the word "house" which defines
the Amendment's scope in terms of common-law ownership distinctions. While
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "house" simply as a "place that
provides shelter [and] living space" and "any place where something is thought
of as living [or] resting," 79 our Fourth Amendment interpretation effectively
adds the requirement that the inhabitant live in the shelter as the owner, renter,
or legal borrower. 80 Thus, David Mooney's living space under the bridge
abutment, while meeting the Webster's definition of "house," did not fit the
legal definition because he did not own it. Therefore, it did not fall into the
textual presumption of protection.
This problem was illustrated in United States v. Ruckanan,81 where the
Tenth Circuit held that the textual meaning of "house" did not extend to the
defendant's cave because it was located on government-owned land. 82
The Fourth Amendment itself proscribes, inter alia, an unreasonable search of
"houses." Without belaboring the matter, we decline to hold that the instant
case comes within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that Ruckman
75 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
76 Id.
77 See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
78 LASSON, supra note 43, at 516.
79 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICrIONARY 680 (2d college ed. 1984).80 See geneially United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1473 (1986).
81 806 F.2d 1471 (1986).
82 Id. at 1473.
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may have subjectively deemed the cave to be his "castle" is not decisive of the
present problem.8
3
In dissent, Judge McKay argued:
That Mr. Ruckman lived in the cave for eight months, constructed a wall and
door to the cave with wooden boards and other material, and installed the
rudimentary comforts of home (including a bed, camp stove, and lantern) is
not enough, says the court, to raise the fourth amendment priority that has
always attached to one's residence .... Moreover, although phrasing the issue
as whether the cave constitutes a "house," much of the court's reasoning
immediately following fails to analyze the characteristics of a house, but rather
focuses on the fact that Mr. Ruckman was a "trespasser" on federal lands and,
as such, could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his wilderness
home.84
This ownership definition of "house," apparent in both the Ruckman and
Mooney cases, has gone largely unnoticed because it historically made good
sense: the overwhelming custom in the United States since its beginning has
been for each person to acquire interest in his living space through a legally
recognized method, usually purchasing. Once one acquired his home in such a
manner, it was reasonable to assume that his private articles would be kept on
his private property where they would be provided the greatest protection from
intrusion by outsiders. Thus, in a scheme where almost everyone in society
owns some minimal amount of private property, land ownership is the simplest
and fairest method of determining where one's privacy rights exist-it ensures
that everyone is entitled to at least one haven from the rest of the world.
This one-dimensional, "ownership" interpretation of the word "house"
was not problematic in eras when almost all of our citizens did own homes and
personal property. Indeed, at the time the drafters chose the words of the
Fourth Amendment, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects," land and building materials were so plentiful on
the frontier, and the economy was expanding so rapidly, that any citizen could
obtain a srifall farm and a log cabin with relative ease. 85 However, to pretend
that this application of a human right is fair and equitable in modem society is
to ignore the unprecedented and continually growing number of people in
America who cannot afford to live on private property.8 6
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1475 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
85 MAx SAVELLE & ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, A HiSTORY OF COLONIAL AMERICA
462 (1966) (Even indentured servants were given a tract of land upon termination of their
contracts.); see also BARCK AND LEFLER, supra note 2, at 245 (stating that land was cheap
and "easy to acquire" in Colonial America).
86 See supra note 5.
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IV. A FOURTH AMENDMENT RECOGNIZING PERSONAL INTERESTS IN
PROPERTY
Given the recognizable shortcomings of the contemporary Fourth
Amendment analysis which hinges its outcome primarily on possessory rights,
it is necessary to search for other concepts to complement present applications.
A. The Personality Theory
One such theory that could be helpful in Fourth Amendment analysis is
Hegel's personality theory of property rights.87 In Hegel's philosophy, tangible
objects serve as a means for individuals to project their abstract wills into the
external world. These objects, or personal possessions, help to define the
individual and play an essential role in the psychological development of all
human beings. For a person to achieve proper self-realization, he must have
some control over resources in the external environment so that he can
"deposit" his abstract person into items that reflect his personality in a concrete
and comprehensible way. These objects become closely bound up with the
individual and become extremely important for the individual to constitute
himself as a continuing personal entity in the world.
Not all objects that a person possesses attain this important personal status,
such as objects that are held for purely instrumental reasons. Such items are
usually exchangeable with other goods of equal value on the market. The
perfect example of such a fungible object is money.88
A dollar is worth no more than what one chooses to buy with it, and one
dollar bill is as good as another. Other examples are Uevelry] in the hands of
the jeweler, the automobile in the hands of the dealer, the land in the hands of
the developer, or the apartment in the hands of the commercial landlord. 89
Personal objects, on the other hand, are ones that an individual feels are
almost part of himself. Common examples include a wedding ring, an
heirloom, or a portrait. However, the universal archetype of a personal object
that an individual needs for self-realization, is the home.90
Thus, the personality theory complements the economic rationale for
protecting the intimacy one develops with his worldly possessions and
87 See generally G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox Trans.) (photo.
reprint 1945) (1942).
88 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960
(1982).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 978, 991. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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surroundings-humans need to maintain a strong relationship with certain
objects because they help to define our abstract persons in a concrete manner.
B. Manifestations of the Personality Theory in American Law
Although Hegel's personality theory has never been explicitly recognized
in American law, it has manifested itself implicitly in many areas. Professor
Margaret Jane Radin explored this manifestation in her article entitled Property
and Personhood.91 According to Radin, the area in which Hegel's philosophy
has had the most influence is in the law of landlord and tenant.92 Modem
courts have increasingly viewed these issues as more intimately connected to
the personhood of the tenant than to the property interest of the landlord as
tenants' rights have dramatically increased in recent decades. 93 First, the trend
of condemning the practice of retaliatory eviction and towards courts granting
permanent tenure to tenants during good behavior-sometimes in violation of
the terms of the lease-is a good example of the personality interests winning
over property interests. Rulings of this type suggest that tenants should be
allowed to become emotionally attached to their living spaces and that the law
should encourage them to do so.
[This judgment is] based on two assumptions. First, that in today's society
a tenant makes an apartment her home in the sense of a sanctuary needed for
personhood. Second, that the old rule, under which the landlord could evict a
tenant without cause at the expiration of the tenancy... may be seen as a way
station along the path toward making the landlord's reversion conditional,
because it is fungible, and the leasehold permanent (though defeasible),
because it is personal. 94
Also, such concepts as adverse possession 95 and the implied warranty of
habitability96 have aspects of the personality theory. The theory of adverse
91 ld. at 960.
92 Id. at 992.
93 Id. at 993.
94 Id. at 995.
95
A method of acquisition of title to real property by possession for a statutory period
under certain conditions.... In order to establish title [by adverse possession], there
must be proof of nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive and
adverse for the statutorily prescribed period. State statutes differ with respect to the
required length of possession from an upper limit of 20 years to a lower one of 5
years ....
BLACK'S LAW DICrlONARY 53 (6th ed. 1990).
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possession not only recognizes that an inhabitant becomes intimately
intertwined with his land over a period of time but rewards him for doing so.
The implied warranty of habitability, which requires landlords to maintain all
of their leased living spaces in a habitable condition, recognizes that every
human needs a sufficiently clean and accomodative living space in order to
satisfy basic dignity and personal interests. In other words, the rule suggests
that "private law should cease allowing some people's fungible property rights
to deprive other people of important opportunities for personhood." 97
Ironically, the most visible manifestation of personality interests has been
in the law's recognition that each individual needs one place where he can go to
be left alone and escape from the world-the need for privacy in one's living
quarters. 98 This respect for the special tie that exists between one's self and his
living space has been a universal theme through most ages and cultures.
According to biblical law, a creditor was not allowed to enter a debtor's
dwelling to collect a debt, but was required to wait outside for the pledge to be
brought forth.99 Likewise, the high regard for the sanctity of one's home was
reflected in the Codes of Hammurabi which provide, "If a man makes a breach
into a house, one shall kill him in front of the breach, and bury him in it."100
Cicero expressed the Roman idea in one of his orations, "What is more
inviolable, what better defended by religion than the house of the
citizen .... This place of refuge is so sacred to all men, that to be dragged
from thence is unlawful."101
This idea that human dignity requires special privacy protection for one's
home is deeply rooted in American culture and law, as expressed by the cliche,
"a man's home is his castle." 102 This theme is consistently reflected by
American courts, as evidenced by Stanley v. Georgia, an obscenity case which
mixed the First Amendment with privacy and sanctity-of-the-home reasoning to
hold that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch." 103 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained
that the drafters of the Constitution were not only influenced by the desire to
96 This warranty imposes a duty on landlords to offer and maintain the premises in a
habitable condition. Although legislation of the 1960s and 1970s has provided the major
thrust towards recognition of this duty, the most dramatic shift has been in the judicial
recognition beginning with Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). ROGER A.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PRoPERTY 313 (1984).
97 Radin, supra note 88, at 996.
98 Id. at 992.
99 LASSON, supra note 43, at 14.
I00 Id. at n.6.
101 Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
102 Radin, supra note 88, at 996.
103 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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protect their property, but were equally moved by these personal privacy
concerns when drafting the Fourth Amendment:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. 104
This idea was most directly expressed in the 1980 case Payton v. New York,
when the Court stated, "[Tihe physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.... At the very core of the
Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable government intrusion."105
When privacy is viewed through the lens of Hegel's personality theory, it
is clear that the current privacy formula based almost entirely on economic
concepts is not an accurate reflection of the reasons why so many societies have
granted special privacy protection to their citizens' living spaces. An individual
does not desire privacy in a living area merely because he owns it. Likewise,
numerous cultures throughout history have not afforded special protection for
the home simply because it had been purchased by someone at some time.
Implicit in our very notion of humanity lies the idea that each person needs a
place to extrapolate her internal self into the external world. Privacy in one's
living space, almost like the nesting ritual of many animals, is necessary for a
self-realizing individual to develop her own identity and self worth in a chaotic
and intrusive environment.
C. A Fourth Amendment Test Recognizing Personality Interests
Curing the inadequacy of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in regards
to homelessness should not require much more than recognizing it-in fact,
recognizing the problem seems to be the primary hurdle. When asking, "Did
the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his living area that
society is prepared to recognize?," the analysis should not stop at, "Did he
have a legal possessory interest?" unless the answer is "Yes." If the answer is
"No," the further questions asked should be, "Was the area his abode?" and
"Did the defendant take affirmative steps to demonstrate to the world that this
area is his private sanctuary where he could be left alone?" This two-prong
104 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
105 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
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analysis would take into consideration not only the economic factors but the
personal and human factors as well. More specifically, the first prong would
resemble the current Fourth Amendment test, with the second prong allowing
individuals a second chance to gain protection by affirmatively establishing a
personal interest in a "home."
Likewise, when defining the word "house" in the text of the Fourth
Amendment, the law should recognize that the word has a much deeper
meaning than the words of ownership on the deed or title registry. A better
definition would acknowledge the historical importance and human dignity
values associated with basic privacy rights and would be more congruent with
Webster's definition, recognizing that David Mooney's privacy concerns in his
sole living space can be just as deep and important as the privacy concerns of a
wealthier counterpart in his empty vacation home.10 6
With this application, property-owning citizens will not be able to avoid
reasonable police searches by claiming that their living space or house is
wherever they happen to be standing when approached, because the fact that
they own a home elsewhere will easily rebut such a statement. Similarly,
homeless individuals would not be given absolute immunity from police
searches and seizures, but would have the burden of establishing a personality
interest-instead of a property interest-in a "home" that they have treated as
their haven from the world and made reasonable efforts to make it such.
In summary, to accommodate our citizens without a legally recognized
possessory interest in land, the current Fourth Amendment test and procedure
would not have to be drastically altered. A test that used property interest as
merely a factor instead of the main ingredient, and also recognized the
legitimate personality claim that each person has for the privacy of his living
space, would provide a more realistic basis for determining privacy rights and,
ultimately, would provide justice to more citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
Because we have forgotten the sources and personal values behind our
privacy needs, our Fourth Amendment protection has become unconscionably
restrictive. The problem is not that some have more than others; it is that those
without are being denied full constitutional protection because they cannot
afford it. Human beings throughout history have not desired their living spaces
to be private sanctuaries merely because they purchased their living space, but
because the various complexities and intricacies of maintaining a human
106 In fact, Mooney argued, to no avail, that his "relationship to his habitat was
extremely personal; that it was not sporadic, irregular, or inconsequential; and that he
maintained the area and the items within it in a private manner right up to the time of the
search." Brief for the Appellant at 8, Mooney (No. 13737).
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identity in this world require that individuals have some private space-some
private haven to manifest their abstract will and personality as their "home." In
defining the breadth of our law and the word "house" in the text of the Fourth
Amendment around ownership and economic concepts while ignoring the
personal and humanconcepts, we have skewed reality to adopt the most
convenient method for determining privacy rights. However, to continue to
deny constitutional privacy to the living areas of the growing number of
citizens like David Mooney is no less than to deny the value of human dignity.
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